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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae are law library associations, individual
law librarians from county, state, federal, and academic
law libraries, and professors of law. These many amici
share a common view that open, equitable, and effective
access to official legal information is a fundamental right,
superior to copyright. We also share the lived experience
of knowing that access to official published law can be
rendered meaningless if interspersed copyrighted content
can be used to limit access and use of the whole work. We
ask the Court to find that if a state publishes binding law
in a publication it designates as official, as Georgia has
done here, the official status of that publication should
override any competing copyright interest in ancillary
material that might otherwise be protected if included in
another type of publication.
Amici rely on unrestricted access to the text of the
official law as designated by the states, including Georgia,
to give effect to our collective missions of facilitating equal
and equitable access to legal information, serving legal
professionals as well as the general public who both govern
and are governed through the law. See Ryan Metheny,
Improving Lives by Building Social Capital: A New Way
to Frame the Work of Law Libraries, 109 Law Libr. J. 631
(2017). For this mission, we rely on full access and reuse
of official legal texts for purposes such as conducting and
supporting legal research and scholarship, teaching legal
research, and preserving state legal materials.
1. Counsel for the parties have consented to this brief. Under
Rule 37.6, amici affirms that no counsel for any party authored
this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amici or its
counsel made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation or
submission of this brief.
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While legal professionals and the public rely on
unrestricted access to the law in order to fulfill their
legal obligations and participate in democratic self-rule,
the present amici have a special and vital need for open,
unencumbered access to the official copies of the law in
order to fulfill their mission. Claims of copyright asserted
over official legal texts inhibit our ability to bridge the
gap for many who need meaningful access to the law by
imposing artificial cost and use restrictions. Copyright
can be wielded to control basic library services such as
reproducing copies for users, or public distribution or
public display of official copies of the law online for remote
access. In the face of such restrictions, notwithstanding
the best efforts of law libraries, our ability to meet the
needs of the public is compromised.
As part of our mandate, amici also note that the
number of pro se patrons interacting with the legal
system continues to grow rapidly. For many of these pro se
litigants, who generally do not have any legal aid available
to them, any additional financial restriction is extremely
burdensome, including fees to view official law publications
levied by commercial publishers such as RELX, the parent
company of the publisher of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (“OCGA”). Law libraries around the United
States are reporting that the number of these pro se litigants
requiring access to legal texts is increasing. See American
Association of Law Libraries, Law Libraries and Access to
Justice, (July 2014), https://www.aallnet.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/01/AccessToJusticeSpecialCommittee2014
LawLibrariesAndAccessToJustice.pdf (last visited Sept.
30, 2019). Those pro se patrons do not have an organization
to represent them before the court, but given their
heavy reliance on law libraries for access to the official
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publications such as the OCGA, we present views that we
believe are also representative of their needs.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Due process and the rule of law require that the public
has meaningful access to “the law.” Every major modern
society since the Greeks has recognized the importance
of this principle. Roscoe Pound, Theories of the Law, 22
Yale L.J. 114, 117 (1912).
In the United States, “the law” largely comes from
appellate courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies
who have been granted rule-making authority. As every
first year law student learns, those law-making bodies
have developed highly specific methods for communicating
their pronouncements of law through official publications,
such as the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (“OCGA”).
Those specific methods and their resulting official
publications serve a number of important functions that
are intrinsic to the underlying purpose of supporting
democracy and of fair notice of the law. Official publications
of the law assure the reader of the reliability and currency
of the text, as well as its acceptance for use in other parts
of the legal system, such as for citation before a court.
Access to official publications is also critical for conducting
and supporting legal scholarship, teaching legal research,
preserving state legal materials, and providing equal and
equitable access to legal information. A critical feature
that enables those uses is that the government has
identified the publication as holding special weight as an
official, authoritative source.
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The major point of this brief is that when a state
gives official status to a publication containing binding
legal pronouncements, the contents of the whole of that
publication must be freely and fully accessible by the
public. Assertion of copyright over even portions of the
publication effectively renders access and use of the core
statutory text meaningless. In addition to the logistical
difficulties of disentangling binding edicts of law from
ancillary materials published with it, if the publication
must be disassembled into its component parts for reuse-annotations protected and filtered out, while the statutory
text may be copied--the remaining pieces are no longer
the “official” publication and unusable for their intended
purpose. A state should not be allowed to assert the
broad and powerful coercive rights granted by copyright
over an official publication of law by interweaving
clearly uncopyrightable edicts of law with otherwise
copyrightable ancillary materials, such as annotations.
Granting copyright protection over even portions of the
OCGA would harm law librarians and by extension the
public, while granting a windfall to publishers and states
who should need no copyright incentive to fulfill their
constitutional obligation to publish official copies of their
laws. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the decision
of the 11th Circuit.
ARGUMENT
I.

PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS AND THE
RULE OF LAW REQUIRE MEA NINGFUL
PUBLIC ACCESS TO OFFICIAL VERSIONS OF
“THE LAW”

The U.S. Constitution demands that the public have
notice of and access to the law. “Every citizen is presumed
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to know the law thus declared, and it needs no argument to
show that justice requires that all should have free access
to the opinions, and that it is against sound public policy
to prevent this, or to suppress and keep from the earliest
knowledge of the public the statutes or the decisions and
opinions of the justices.” Nash v. Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559, 560
(Mass. 1886).
Despite “not needing an argument,” courts have
supported this principle as a basic requirement of due
process:
Due process requires people to have notice
of what the law requires of them so that they
may obey it and avoid its sanctions. So long as
the law is generally available for the public to
examine, then everyone may be considered to
have constructive notice of it; any failure to
gain actual notice results from simple lack of
diligence. But if access to the law is limited,
then the people will or may be unable to learn of
its requirements and may be thereby deprived
of the notice to which due process entitles them.
Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d
730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980).
While binding edicts of law are a particularly
important type of legal publication, this court has also
held in a number of cases, particularly with regard to
judicial proceedings, but also in other contexts, that
the public has certain rights to access and use other
legal documents and related government publications
as well. This tradition has a long history rooted in the
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idea of democratic government. See “Letter from James
Madison to W.T. Barry” (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 Writings
of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (“A popular
Government, without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy;
or, perhaps both.”). The basic principle of access is driven
by the idea that citizens have a right to interact freely
with the output of their government in order to properly
govern themselves. For example, “[t]he freedom of the
press to publish that information appears to us to be of
critical importance to our type of government in which
the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of
public business. In preserving that form of government
the First and Fourteenth Amendments command nothing
less than that the States may not impose sanctions on the
publication of truthful information contained in official
court records open to public inspection.” Cox Broad. Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975).
While records such as court documents and other nonbinding legal materials must be freely publishable and
accessible without threat of liability, much more so is the
need for the public to access official legal publications that
are primarily composed of binding law. For law libraries
in particular, copyright over official publications raises
the prospect of liability for everything from everyday
uses such as providing individual copies for lawyers,
to emerging uses such as digital access through online
library portals that allow law libraries to bring the text
of the law to many more users who are homebound,
disabled, or without resources to travel to a physical law
library. While law libraries have long served a variety
of constituencies, their mission has recently emphasized
a focus on those historically excluded from access to
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justice. See Am. Ass’n Of Law Libraries, Law Libraries
and Access To Justice: A Report of the American
Association of Law Libraries Special Committee on
Access to Justice (July 2014), http://www.aallnet.org/mm/
Publications/products/atjwhitepaper.pdf. For example,
although they do not have their own national association,
prison law libraries play a major role in access to the
legal system for those who are incarcerated. In fact,
courts have stated that the “Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees state inmates the
right to ‘adequate, effective, and meaningful’ access to
the courts.’” Petrick v. Maynard, 11 F.3d 991, 994 (10th
Cir. 1993) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822
(1977)). The guarantee of this court access is satisfied
“by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.”
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. The logical prerequisite to this
guarantee of access is that law libraries themselves must
be able to provide access to official copies of the law to
their users. This includes access to related materials such
as notes, commentary, and other useful annotations that
are created or commissioned by the government as part
of the “official” code. Law libraries have long worked to
overcome the many natural barriers that exist for users
to access these materials--for example, printing physical
copies of law books is costly, and access to the internet
is not free--but requiring law libraries to also tackle
artificial legal barriers, such as copyright, that are erected
solely for economic profit is incompatible with the spirit
and principle of the rule of law and of due process.
In this case, the state of Georgia seeks the right to
hold users of the OCGA liable for copyright infringement
by asserting that because parts of the official publication
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are copyrighted, copying of the whole of the OCGA is
impermissible. The Constitutional bar for adequate
access to the law is not high--legislatures must do
“nothing more than enact and publish the law,” Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532 (1982)--and so states
are free to adopt a variety of ways to communicate the
law’s requirements. Indeed, states differ significantly in
their approach to statutory publications, codifications,
and the weight and authority they vest with either type
of publication. However, when a state makes a choice
to imbue a particular publication with special “official”
status, authority, and evidentiary weight, it should not also
be permitted to threaten its citizens and other members
of the public with serious legal liability when they freely
reuse that publication, regardless of whether the state
includes in the publication materials such as annotations,
that would otherwise be copyrightable if published in
another publication.
A.

Official versions of codes are published under
the authority of the state and carry special
weight as evidence of legislative enactments.

When a state designates a legal publication as
“official,” that designation is important, often carrying
with it significance as a matter of reliability and its use
as evidence of legislative enactments. As legislation is
created, copies emanate into the world with a variety
of legal statuses. The original session law is, in many
states, viewed as the canonical text--perfect evidence of
the legislative enactment--while other publications of the
law, such as an official statutory codification, are afforded
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their own special evidentiary status. 2 Yet other versions,
such as commercial editions published by an independent
publisher, or free but unverified electronic copies, carry
no special evidentiary weight.
For example, the majority of the subject-based
codification of the official United States Code is viewed
by the courts as “prima facie evidence that the provision
has the force of law.” See United States National Bank of
Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc.
508 U.S. 439 (1993); see also 1 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2018). These
distinctions are a matter of law. See Stephan v. United
States, 319 U.S. 423 (1969) (stating that “the very meaning
of ‘prima facie’ is that the Code cannot prevail over the
Statutes at Large when the two are inconsistent.”).
This issue of what constitutes evidence of “the law”
has also been litigated at the state level in states like
Minnesota, Idaho, and Florida with courts in those states
pointing out that while their codes are not the canonical
“laws themselves,” they are given special status by
providing prima facie evidence of it. See State v. Boecker,
893 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn. 2017). See also Peterson v.
Peterson, 156 Idaho 85, 89-90 (2014); Shuman v. State, 358
So.2d 1333, 1338 (Fl. 1978). Although the issue has not been
litigated frequently, at least one state appellate court has
pointed out the difference in an official legal publication
versus an unofficial one—in this case, one produced by a
2. In some states and for portions of the United States Code,
legislatures have reenacted statutory codifications as “positive law,”
transforming those portions of the code from prima facia evidence
of the law into enacted, perfect fidelity copies of the law itself. See
Mary Whisner, The United States Code, Prima Facie Evidence, and
Positive Law, 101 Law Libr. J. 545 (2009).
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commercial third-party, West Publishing Company—by
explaining that unofficial statutory compilations do not
become the official version of the law just by the practice
of the bar or courts, and thus unofficial codifications are
not law that should be cited in courts. In re Appeal of
Tenet HealthSystems Bucks County, LLC, 880 A.2d 721,
725-726 (Pa. Super. 2005). Distinctions between official
and unofficial versions of the law matter, and thus the
public’s right to access official versions of annotated codes
should not be conflated with their right to access unofficial
annotated codes. If litigants are left only with unimpeded
access to unofficial publications of the law, they rely on
the law at their own peril.
Not every state chooses to officially codify their law.
For example, Virginia does not officially codify its laws,
with the Acts of Assembly forming the “official law of
the Commonwealth.” The Executive Committee of the
Virginia Code Commission, http://codecommission.dls.
virginia.gov/code-of-virginia-codification-policies.shtml
(last visited September 6, 2019). In other states, like
Arkansas, and in this case, Georgia, states not only codify,
but enact the codification as law. See Ark. Code. Ann.
§ 1-2-102 (2019). When states chose to officially codify, then
those codifications become law and the state should not be
permitted to burden core rights of access to that law by
interspersing copyrighted additions and then asserting
that the whole is then copyrighted.
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B. The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is the
only official version of the code of Georgia, and
as a matter of due process, residents and those
affected by the laws of Georgia have a right to
access it.
In Georgia’s case, the Official Code of Georgia is
the “legal evidence of laws” as it is codified as positive
law. OCGA § 1-1-1 (2019). The Official Code of Georgia
Annotated is both published under the official authority
of the state (under state seal) and as the official text of
statutory law in Georgia. All litigants in Georgia courts
are required, by law, to cite to the Official Code of Georgia.
In 1982, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia indicated that anyone citing the non-official
version of the Georgia Code “will do so at his own peril
if there is any inaccuracy in that publication or any
discrepancy.” Georgia v. The Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp
110, 117 (N.D.Ga 1982). The State of Georgia is not the only
legal entity that demands access and citation to the OCGA.
The 11th Circuit similarly requires litigants to cite to the
OCGA, via incorporation by reference of “The Bluebook: A
Uniform System of Citation,” which requires that litigants
cite to the current official statutory code currently in force.
11th Circ. R. 28-1(k). See also “The Bluebook: A Uniform
System of Citation” 248, T.1.3 (20th Ed. 2015) (“[c]ite to
Ga. Code Ann. (published by LexisNexis), if therein.”).
Indeed, the first statute in the OCGA proclaims
the OCGA as the only official version of the statutory
code in the state of Georgia, “The statutory portion of
the codification of Georgia laws prepared by the Code
Revision Commission and the Michie Company pursuant
to a contract entered into on June 19, 1978, is enacted and
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shall have the effect of statutes enacted by the General
Assembly of Georgia.” OCGA § 1-1-1 (2019). The statutory
text goes on to make clear, “The statutory portion of
such codification shall be merged with annotations,
captions, catchlines, history lines, editorial notes, crossreferences, indices, title and chapter analyses, and other
materials pursuant to the contract and shall be published
by authority of the state pursuant to such contract and
when so published shall be known and may be cited as the
‘Official Code of Georgia Annotated.’” Id. Thus, the statute
makes clear two principles: First, that the OCGA is the
only official version of the law and second, that the OCGA
only exists as published under contract to include also
annotations, captions, catchlines, history lines, editorial
notes, cross-references, indices, title and chapter analysis,
etc. Without these parts, there is no “official” version of
the OCGA. So, for example, the free version of the Georgia
Code that the state of Georgia makes available through
Lexis’s website is not official, cannot be cited in court, and
cannot be relied upon in courts by the public. Unless the
official version of the law, the OCGA, is available for use
without encumbrance, Georgia fails in its responsibilities
to ensure that its citizens have access to the law.
II. “ T H E L AW ” I S I N S E PA R A BL E F R O M
THE OFFICIAL, AUTHORITATIVE LEGAL
PUBLICATIONS IN WHICH IT IS PUBLISHED
The documents that make up a published law
are evocative because they communicate to readers
information about three key attributes, “officialness,
authenticity and authority,” that assure users that the
document they are accessing is actually “the law.” Leslie A.
Street & David R. Hansen, Who Owns the Law? Why We
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Must Restore Public Ownership of Legal Publishing, 26 J.
Intell. Prop. L. 205, 210 (2019). All of these characteristics
are particularly important in the legal process.
However, of these three characteristics, the “official”
factor is the most critical for law libraries to continue to
provide free, non-discriminatory, unencumbered access to
the complete official law to their patrons. Interference with
access to official texts comes in many forms: the process
of licensing materials itself is frequently burdensome on
important uses. Even just understanding and negotiating
license terms can take significant time and expertise.
Furthermore, access to contractual restrictions and
high fees mean that law libraries are often not positioned
to provide materials in their collections on the terms
patrons need to have meaningful access to the law. These
interferences with access stem directly from one greater
risk, which is the focus of the present case: allowing the
government to copyright the official law.
If copyright in an official code is allowed, the law has
the potential to be frustratingly split up into different
parts, further confusing the purpose of the “official”
status and interfering with legitimate access and use.
If the government splits official legal publications into
protectable and unprotectable elements, this divided
text can no longer be called “official.” If it is not official,
it can not be used or cited by legal researchers in the
courts. It is also disfavored for use in legal scholarship, for
teaching legal research, and for preservation purposes. In
addition, allowing copyright to protect these official legal
publications can have long term ramifications for access,
technology, and innovation. This action will restrict those
entities - whether the present amici at law libraries, but
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also public libraries, prison libraries, legal publishers,
legal technology innovators, or the general public - from
providing access to others who lack the means to comply
with the copyright owner’s demands. When official sources
of the law are not burdened with copyright, anyone,
including law libraries, can take the law and make it easier
for people to use and find. Those critical functions simply
cannot be accomplished when the law is copyrighted.
An element of this same risk was laid out clearly in an
earlier case involving a legal publisher. West Publishing
previously prepared the books of the National Reporter
System and the page citations they created became
a fundamental requirement in legal citation. In West
Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219
(8th Cir. 1986), Lexis, a relative newcomer to the legal
publication market at the time, sought to create their
own database of case law, including “star pagination,”
which was a unique method of corresponding to each page
number in West’s National Reporter System. Id. at 1222.
West claimed that Lexis’s inclusion of star pagination was
copyright infringement. Id. Initially, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed a preliminary injunction, finding that there was
a potential infringement. See id. at 1229. However, over
the following decades, scholars noted that this decision
effectively restrained the general access to the law,
by letting one single commercial entity control the law
through copyright, and suppressed any innovation and
development of computer legal research technologies
that would have aided further access to the law. See
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Open Access in a Closed Universe,
10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 797 (2006). Splitting legal
publications into protectable pagination and unprotectable
legal decisions was the direct cause of hampering future
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innovation in access to law. Eventually, the parties settled,
and pagination was no longer a copyright issue. The result
allowed Lexis and several other legal research innovators
to enter the market without fear of litigation for making
the law available. Id. at 823
In the present case, the Court can avoid a similar
potential set-back for innovation in legal access and
research technology by simply ruling that a designation
of a law as “official” by the government makes the official
law uncopyrightable.
Additionally, the State of Georgia, itself, mandates that
any interpretation of the official statutes should require
access to all the official legal materials which may include
materials that are not merely the plain language of the
statute. “In all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall
look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly,
keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil, and the
remedy.” Ga. Code Ann. § 1-3-1 (2018). The annotations
at issue in this case certainly aid this mandatory rule to
discover the “intention of the General Assembly” – which
could include notes, cross-references, and other parts of
the official materials printed in the OCGA. The Georgia
common law states that “[t]he cardinal or pre-eminent
rule governing the construction of statutes is to carry into
effect the legislative intent and purpose if that is within
constitutional limits.” Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie,
62 S.E.2d 209, 211 (1950). Again, the annotations at issue
must be accessible to the public, so that citizens can
discover “the effect the legislative intent and purpose”
that is required for proper legal analysis of the statutes.
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III. C O P Y R I G H T O F O F F I C I A L L E G A L
PUBLICATIONS FRUSTRATES PRINCIPLES
OF DUE PROCESS AND DOES NOT SERVE THE
PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A.

The expansive control that copyright owners
wield is incompatible with the due process
interests of the public in access to and use of
official legal publications.

The Copyright Act grants holders of rights broad,
exclusive rights to control reuse of their works. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (2019). Sometimes referred to as a “limited monopoly,”
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 229 (1990), those rights
include the right of copyright owners to control how and
when the works they own are made available to the world.
Copyright owners, for example, have the exclusive right
to determine when or even if to publish a work. Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539 (1985). (“The right of first publication encompasses
not only the choice whether to publish at all, but also the
choices of when, where, and in what form first to publish
a work”). Further, this Court has stated, “[t]he owner of
the copyright, if he pleases, may refrain from vending or
licensing and content himself with simply exercising the
right to exclude others from using his property.” Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
Copyright owners may also leverage their exclusive
rights to impose significant restrictions on who may have
access, when, for how much, and under what circumstances
through licensing restrictions. Courts have held, for
example, that owners of copyrightable websites or
software may impose terms on access such as mandatory
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arbitration, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147
(7th Cir. 1997) and choice of forum, CompuServe, Inc. v.
Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
Indeed, Lexis has imposed in its publication of
the unofficial, free version of the Georgia Code online
significant contractual restrictions on access and use.
See Terms of Use, LexisNexis. https://www.lexisnexis.
com/terms (https://perma.cc/RQ4Z-9AYN) (last visited
September 30, 2019). Among them are that its contents
may only be used for personal use, id. at § 2.1, “Limitations
on Use” (“The Content on this Web Site is for your
personal use only and not for commercial exploitation.”),
may not be reproduced or republished “all or in part”
except for personal purposes (apparently excluding use
in legal filings), users must agree to surrender rights to
pursue other unrelated claims against Lexis, id. at § 4.6
“Intellectual Property Rights” (“You agree that you shall
have no recourse against Provider for any alleged or actual
infringement or misappropriation of any proprietary or
other right in the Postings you provide to Provider”),
users must follow specific conditions on how they can link
to the code, id. at § 6 “Linking to this Web Site”, agree to
have their use of the content tracked and monitored, id. at
§ 23 “Privacy”, and agree to a governing law and forum
in another state, § 22 “Governing Law and Jurisdiction”
(specifying New York). Finally, Lexis asserts the rights
to change these terms at any time with minimal notice to
users. Id. at § 26 “Modification to terms of use.”
These types of contractual terms are not unusual
to find on any website, including sites offering access
to unofficial versions of other states’ codes. See, e.g.,
Arkansas Code Public Access, https://portal.arkansas.gov/
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agency/bureau-of-legislative-research/service/arkansascode-search-laws-and-statutes/. But permitting copyright
to extend to official legal publications such as the OCGA
creates a potent and troubling combination. In that
situation, not only can website operators such as Lexis
impose license terms as a condition of access to their site,
they can also act as the exclusive source for such content,
threatening copyright infringement liability against
organizations such as Public.Resource.Org and non-profit
law libraries that seek to provide public access to the
OCGA, free of these kinds of restrictions. Those liability
threats are serious, giving the state of Georgia coercive
control. A law library that scans and shares copies of the
OCGA with its users faces penalties of up to $150,000 per
work infringed. 17 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2019). That same
library faces impoundment or destruction of any copies
made. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2019). And if a library user--for
example a lawyer at a for-profit law firm--merely copied
and used those scans and was found to have done so “for
purposes of commercial advantage,” that law firm could
face criminal liability. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2019).
Because the OCGA, the whole of it and not just in part,
is the complete legal publication to which the public must
have access, the control that copyright law would grant
the state is incompatible with that goal. “We cannot see
how this aspect of copyright protection can be squared
with the right of the public to know the law to which it is
subject.” Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc.,
628 F.2d 730, 735 (1st Cir. 1980).
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B. Granting Exclusive Rights in the OCGA Does
Not Serve the Purposes of Copyright
The Copyright Act ultimately aims to achieve the
Constitutional goal to “promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. Art 1, Cl. 8 Sec. 8.
“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ ”
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954)).
But in this case, the incentive structure that the
Copyright Act is built on is entirely unnecessary. As a
matter of due process, states must publish their laws. No
additional incentive is needed because the Constitution
demands it. While states are free to choose from a variety
of ways to do that, whatever the method chosen, states
must follow through on their obligation.
Second, and more specifically to the arguments of
Georgia and some of its amici, the copyright incentives
for publishing law, even with ancillary research aids
such as annotations, are not nearly as significant as are
claimed. A brief review of legal publishing bears this out.
Beginning with common law cases in the early nineteenth
century, courts began to recognize that applying copyright
protection to primary law was harmful to the public
interest. See, e.g., Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617,
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645-47 (1888); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253-54
(1888); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834);
Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 138 (6th Cir. 1898); Davidson
v. Wheelock, 27 F. 61, 62 (C.C.D. Minn. 1866); Nash v.
Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559, 562-63 (Mass. 1886)). Later, the
federal government codified these decisions into the U.S.
Code, barring copyright protection for U.S. government
works, including, any official laws. See 17 U.S.C. § 101,
§ 105 (2019).
In Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834), this Court
resolved a dispute between the Court’s first and second
official reporters. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 63, 3 Stat.
376 (providing for an official reporter). Henry Wheaton,
the first reporter, published reports containing the text
of Justices’ opinions and, additionally, his own unique
annotations, including statements of the cases’ facts,
procedural histories, and abstracts of the Court’s decisions.
Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 617. After Wheaton, the second official
reporter, Richard Peters, created his own summaries of
the Court’s prior decisions. In doing so, Peters used some
parts of Wheaton’s annotations. See Craig A. Joyce, The
Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional
Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendency, 83 Mich.
L. Rev. 1291, 1364-1385 (1985). Wheaton sued Peters for
copyright infringement. The Court’s decision stated that
“no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written
opinions delivered by this court.” Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 668.
See also Craig Joyce, A Curious Chapter in the History of
Judicature: Wheaton v. Peters and the Rest of the Story
(of Copyright in the New Republic), 42 Hous. L. Rev. 325,
351 (2005).
Later, Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888)
expanded the holding from Wheaton, denying copyright
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protection for state judicial opinions. The materials at
issue in Banks, the Ohio court’s opinions and its statements
of the case and syllabuses, were “exclusively the work of
the judges,” and were “not… author[ed]” by the court’s
official reporter. Id. at 251. Therefore, applying the “public
policy” announced in Wheaton (that “no copyright could
... be secured in the products of the labor done by judicial
officers in the discharge of their judicial duties,”) the Court
held that the copying of the judge-created materials did
not provide grounds for an infringement claim. See id.
at 253-254. The “work done by the judges . . . is free for
publication to all” because it “constitutes the authentic
exposition and interpretation of the law, which[] bind[s]
every citizen.” Id. at 253.
In the midst of all these rulings, states continued
to publish their law and, in at least some cases, did so
complete with ancillary research tools. For example,
in North Carolina, the North Carolina State Supreme
Court has now published its official reports for well over a
century, complete with annotated headnotes. That practice
began in the late 1800s and the commercial transaction
was simple and free from exclusive copyright control, the
annotator (in that case, a North Carolina Supreme Court
justice) was paid a fixed amount, between $25 and $50
a volume, to produce the annotations. J. Walter Clark,
History of the Supreme Court Reports of North Carolina
and of the Annotated Reprints, 22 N.C. 11-14 (1921).
In many other states the creation of research aids has
proliferated as well in the absence of exclusive control over
the official text. For many states, commercial publishers
have found the market lucrative enough to publish
their own unofficial versions of the code, complete with
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annotations. E.g., compare West’s North Carolina Code
Annotated (West) with North Carolina General Statutes
(the official Lexis publication). This Court’s own reports
are published in a number of versions, both official and
commercial, which include copyrightable additional
content. Compare L. Edition Preface with U.S. Reports
Preface, with S. Ct Reports Preface.
Our contention is not that such annotations are
uncopyrightable, or that copyright does not act as an
incentive to promote their creation. When produced
independently and published in unofficial publications,
those tools may well be protectable. However, the purposes
of Copyright are not served, nor are the interests of the
public, when creative tools such as annotations are so
merged with an official publication that exercise of that
copyright prevents effective use of the official publication
as a whole. In that case, the legally coercive power that
copyright grants would interfere with public use and
should yield to those interests.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
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Law Librarians of New England (LLNE)
Law Library Association of Greater New York
(LLAGNY)
Legal Information Preservation Alliance (LIPA)
Southeastern Association of Law Libraries (SEAALL)
Southwestern Association of Law Libraries (SWALL)
Adam Masarek
Strategic Legal Insights Attorney
Greenberg Traurig
Adeen Postar
Law Library Director and Professor of Practice
American University, Washington College of Law
Alyson Drake
Assistant Director for Operations & Educational
Programs; Director, Excellence in Legal Research
Program; Adjunct Professor of Law
Texas Tech University School of Law
Amanda Runyon
Associate Dean and Director
of the Biddle Law Library
University of Pennsylvania Law School
1. Institutions are listed for identification purposes only. All
individual signatories are participating in their individual capacity,
not on behalf of their institutions.
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Amanda Watson
Assistant Professor and Director
of the O’Quinn Law Library
University of Houston Law Center
Amy A. Emerson
Director of the Law Library
and Assistant Professor of Law
Villanova University, Charles Widger
School of Law
Amy Wharton
Director of the Arthur J. Morris Law Library
University of Virginia School of Law
Andrew Lang
Reference Librarian
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Anna Lawless-Collins
Associate Director for Systems
& Collection Services
Boston University School of Law
Anne Klinefelter
Director of the Law Library
and Professor of Law
University of North Carolina
Anne T. Gilliland
Scholarly Communications Officer
and Associate Law Librarian
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
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Ashley Krenelka Chase
Associate Director
Stetson University College of Law
Ashley Matthews
Reference Librarian
George Mason University Law Library
Benjamin Carlson
Head of Digital Initiatives
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Benjamin J. Keele
Research and Instructional Services Librarian,
Ruth Lilly Law Library
Indiana University, Robert H. McKinney
School of Law
Beth Williams
Senior Director of the Robert Crown
Law Library & Senior Lecturer in Law
Stanford Law School
Billie Jo Kaufman
Interim Law Library Director
& Visiting Professor of Law
Mercer University School of Law
Bonita Shucha
Associate Dean & Director of the Law Library
University of Wisconsin Law School

4a
Appendix
Brian Barnes
Law Library Director & Associate Professor
Loyola University New Orleans
Brian R. Huffman
Electronic Services Librarian
University of Hawai‘i
Camille Broussard
Associate Dean for Information Services and
Director of the Mendik Law Library
New York Law School
Candle Wester
Associate Director for Faculty Services
& Administration
University of South Carolina
Cara Henley Johnson
Library Manager
O’Melveny
Carissa Vogel
Associate Dean for Library Services, Director of
the Law Library & Professor of Legal Research
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,
Yeshiva University
Catherine Biondo
Research Librarian
Harvard Law School
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Catherine Dunn
Director, Westminster Law Library
& Professor in University Libraries
University of Denver, Sturm College of Law
Charlie Amiot
Student Services and Outreach Librarian
University of Kentucky College of Law
Cindy Hirsch
Reference Law Librarian
University of Maine School of Law
Clanitra Stewart Nejdl
Research Services Librarian and Lecturer in Law
Vanderbilt University Law School
Courtney Selby
Associate Dean for Library Services
& Associate Professor of Legal Research
St. John’s University School of Law
Dana Rubin
Reference Librarian
New York University School of Law
David Isom
Faculty Services Librarian
University of San Diego School of Law
Dennis Kim-Prieto
Reference Librarian
Rutgers School of Law
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Diane M. Rodriguez
Assistant Director
San Francisco Law Library
Duncan Alford
Associate Dean, Directory of the Law Library,
and Professor of Law
University of South Carolina School of Law
Edward T. Hart
Assistant Dean for Law Library
UNT Dallas College of Law
Emma Wood
Associate Librarian
UMass Dartmouth Law Library
Erika Cohn
Director of the Law Library
Associate Professor
Saint Louis University School of Law
Faye Jones
Director and Clinical Professor
University of Illinois
Fred Dingledy
Senior Reference Librarian
The Wolf Law Library, William
& Mary Law School

7a
Appendix
Genevieve Tung
Associate Director
Rutgers Law Library
George Taoultsides
Manager, Faculty Research and Scholarly Support
Harvard Law School Library
Greg Lambert
Chief Knowledge Services Officer
Jackson Walker LLP
Heather Casey
Int’l & Foreign Law Reference Librarian
Georgetown University Law Center
Heidi Frostestad Kuehl
Director of the David C. Shapiro
Memorial Law Library
Northern Illinois University College of Law
Jamie J. Baker
Associate Dean & Director, Professor of Law
Texas Tech University School of Law Library
Jane Larrington
Associate Director & Head of Public Services
University of San Diego Legal Research Center
Janet Sinder
Professor of Law & Director of the Library
Brooklyn Law School
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Jeffrey Schoerner
Research Analyst & Librarian
Morrison & Foerster LLP
Jennifer L. Behrens
Associate Director for Administration
& Scholarship
J. Michael Goodson Law Library,
Duke University School of Law
John Joergensen
Senior Associate Dean for Information Services
Rutgers Law School
John R. Beatty
Faculty Scholarship Outreach Librarian
Charles B. Sears Law Library,
University at Buffalo
Jootaek Lee
Librarian III/ Assistant Professor
Rutgers Law School
Julie Graves Krishnaswami
Head of Research Instruction
Yale Law School
Julie Kimbrough
Acting Director of the Law Library
& Clinical Assistant Professor of Law
Kathrine R. Everett Law Library
University of North Carolina School of Law
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Kate Irwin-Smiler
Reference Librarian
Professional Center Library, Wake Forest
University School of Law
Kathleen Delaurenti
Head Librarian
Peabody Institute
Kelly Leong
Head of Reference
Maloney Law Library,
Fordham University School of Law
Kelly Reynolds
Law Reference Librarian
University of Oregon
Ken Rodriguez
Reference & Intellectual Property
Law Librarian; Professorial Lecturer in Law
The George Washington University
Law School, Burns Law Library
Kein Garewal
Associate Director of Collections
Harvard Law School
Kristina J. Alayan
Law Library Director & Assistant Professor of Law
Howard University School of Law
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Laureen C. Urquiaga
Digital Services Librarian
Howard W. Hunter Law Library
Lee F. Peoples
Associate Dean of Library & Technology
Frederick Charles Hicks Professor of Law
Oklahoma City University School of Law
Lisa A. Goodman
Executive Professor and Director
of the Law Library
Texas A&M University School of Law
Louis M. Rosen
Reference Librarian, Associate
Professor of Law Library
Barry University School of Law
Lu Tuan Nguyen
Reference Librarian
Orange County Public Law Library
Margaret K Maes
Executive Director, Retired
Legal Information Preservation Alliance
Mari Cheney
Assistant Director, Research and Instruction
Lewis & Clark Law School, Boley Law Library
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Mariah Ford
Research Services Librarian
Vanderbilt Law School
Mark Williams
Head of Collections
Vanderbilt University Law School
Mary Beth Parker
Associate Director of Operations & Collections
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad
College of Law, Panza Maurer Law Library
Mary Jenkins
Director, Research Solutions
Accufile
Mary Rumsey
Reference and Instructional Services Librarian
Willamette University College of Law
Mary S. Searles
Law Librarian/Director
The John W. King New Hampshire Law Library
Melinda Kent
Manager, Research Services
Harvard Law School Library
Melissa J Bernstein
Director and Professor James E. Faust
Law Library
University of Utah, College of Law
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Michael Chiorazzi
Associate dean for Information Services
University of Miami School of Law
Michelle Hook Dewey
Legal Research Services Manager
BakerHostetler
Michelle Trumbo
Executive Director
Legal Information Preservation Alliance
Michelle Wu
Associate Dean for Library Services
and Professor of Law
Georgetown Law
Mitchell Silverman
Independent Legal Education Consultant
Mitchell L. Silverman, Infoneed Research
Patrick J. Charles
Library Director & Associate Professor of Law
Gonzaga University School of Law
Paul Gatz
Reference Librarian and Adjunct Professor
The Ohio State University
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Pauline M. Aranas
Associate Dean, John Stauffer Charitable Trust
Chief Information Officer, Director of the Law
Library, and Adjunct Professor of Law
University of Southern California
Gould School of Law
Phillip Thomas Gragg
Associate Dean for Library and Information
Services and Associate Professor of Law
California Western School of Law
Pia M. Hunter
Teaching Assistant Professor
Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Law Library,
University of Illinois College of Law
Rachel Green
Faculty Services Librarian
UCLA School of Law
Raquel J. Gabriel
Professor of Law & Director of the Law Library
City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law
Richard Leiter
Director of the Schmid Law Library
University of Nebraska
Rick Goheen
Asst. Dean for the LaValley Law Library
& Assoc. Professor of Law
University of Toledo
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Robert M. Truman
Associate Dean and Director
Boley Law Library, Lewis & Clark Law School
Roger Skalbeck
Professor of Law
University of Richmond School of Law
Ronald E Wheeler
Director of the Fineman and Pappas Law Libraries
Associate Professor of Law and Legal Research
Boston University School of Law
Ryan Metheny
Managing Librarian, Legal Education
LA Law Library
Sara Paul Raffel
Research Manager
Crowell and Moring LLP
Sara Sampson
Assistant Dean for Information Services
& Communications, Director of Law Library,
and Senior Lecturer
The Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law
Sarah A. Lewis
Faculty Services Librarian
& Assistant Professor of Legal Research
University of Kentucky College of Law
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Sarah Dunaway
Research Services Librarian, Lecturer in Law
Vanderbilt University Law School
Sarah Lamdan
Professor of Law
CUNY School of Law
Sarah Walangitan
Librarian
Supreme Court of Illinois - Chicago Branch
Shanna Pritchett
Librarian III
Nevada Supreme Court Law Library
Shira Megerman
Senior Legal Information Librarian
Boston University School of Law
Simon Canick
Associate Dean, Law Library & Technology;
Law School Professor
University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law
Stacy Fowler
Associate Professor & Technical Services Librarian
St. Mary’s University Law Library
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Susan Azyndar
Reference Librarian and Adjunct Professor
Moritz Law Library, Moritz College of Law
Susan deMaine
Associate Librarian
Indiana University
Susan Drisko Zago
Law Library Director and Professor of Law
University of New Hampshire Franklin Pierce
School of Law
Tina M. Brooks
Electronic Services Librarian & Associate
Professor of Legal Research
University of Kentucky College of Law
Todd Venie
Assistant Dean and Director for the Library and
Information Technology Services
Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University
Ulysses Jaen
Director & Professor
Ave Maria School of Law
Vicenç Feliú
Associate Dean for Library Services
and Professor of Law
NSU - Florida Shepard Broad College of Law
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Victoria Williamson
Director
Riverside County Law Library
Wickliffe W. Shreve II
Faculty & Scholarly Services Librarian
and Senior Lecturing Fellow
Duke University School of Law
Yasmin Morais
Cataloging and Reference Librarian
David A. Clarke School of Law,
University of the District of Columbia
Yasmin Sokkar Harker
Law Library Professor
CUNY Law

